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ABSTRACT
Ensuring the early detection of important social network users
is a challenging task. Some peer ranking services are now well es-
tablished, such as PeerIndex, Klout, or Kred. Their function is to
rank users according to their influence. This notion of influence
is however abstract, and the algorithms achieving this ranking are
opaque. Following the rising demand for a more transparent web,
we explore the problem of gaining knowledge by reverse enginee-
ring such peer ranking services, with regards to the social network
topology they get as an input. Since these services exploit the on-
line activity of users (and therefore their connectivity in social net-
works), we provide a precise evaluation of how topological metrics
of the social network impact the final user ranking. Our approach
is the following : we first model the ranking service as a black-box
with which we interact by creating user profiles and by performing
operations on them. Through those profiles, we trigger some slight
topological modifications. By monitoring the impact of these mo-
difications on the rankings of those profiles, we infer the weight of
each topological metric in the black-box, thus reversing the service
influence cookbook.
1. INTRODUCTION
The need for an increased transparency in the functioning of
web-services has recently arised, motivated by various use cases
such as privacy or copyright control. For example, work such as [7]
proposes to retrieve which piece of information in a user-profile
triggered a particular advertisement. Goal is thus to infer the in-
ternals of black-box services provided by companies on the web.
Klout or PeerIndex propose to rank users based on their behavior
on social networks (using their social connectivity and activity).
They nevertheless keep secret the algorithms and parameters used
for this ranking 1. This motivated some users to try reversing their
internals [4]. Sometimes information leaks about some of the in-
gredients in those hidden recipes ; the CEO of PeerIndex for ins-
tance admitted to leverage Pagerank 2 (and thus graph topological-
metrics), to compute user intrinsic influence in a network. Such an
understanding of which metrics are involved is also of a particu-
lar interest for information sharing and coordination, as it has been
shown that some centrality metrics correlate with the actual ability
of network actors to coordinate others [5, 3]. This knowledge can
then serve to assess if the centrality metric leveraged by the ran-
king function makes the ranking service relevant to dispatch roles
for given tasks for example [3].
1. Those services may provide a score as an output. Clearly, re-
versing a ranking function is harder than reversing a score, as you
can obtain a ranking from scores, while the opposite is impossible.
2. blog post on Quora
Nevertheless, reverse engineering such black-boxes is a challen-
ging task. Indeed, in this web-service paradigm, the user only has
access to the output of the algorithm, and cannot extract any side-
information. Moreover, in many cases such as in peer ranking ser-
vices, the user can only take action on a limited part of the algo-
rithm input. Motivated by this challenge for transparency, we ask
the following question : can a user infer, from the results retur-
ned by such peer ranking algorithms, what are the topological
metrics in use, and to which extent ?
We first introduce the ranking service we consider and model
our actions, before warming-up on a toy example. We then genera-
lize the example and provide a construction to identify the use of
a single arbitrary centrality among a given set of candidates. Then,
we assume that the ranking can be produced by a linear combi-
nation of multiple centralities, and give a generic reverse engineer
approach. We conclude by illustrating such a generic approach on
a concrete scenario, before giving perspectives.
2. MODEL&WARMUP : REVERSINGONE
CENTRALITY
Let us model a social web-service. Each user is represented by a
vertex v, together with a set of (possibly unknown to the user) attri-
butes a(v). To interact with the web-service, users have access to a
finite set of actions A. We consider two types of actions : i) single
actions that only involve a single user (e.g., posting a message on
a wall) and might change part of the user profile a(v). And ii), pair
actions that involve a pair of users (e.g., following, declaring or de-
leting a “friendship” relation). These actions impact the network of
relations among users, that we capture as a graph G∞(V, E), with V
and E being respectively the set of vertices and edges in that graph.
Among the features of this web-service, a ranking of the users
is available. While the internals of the ranking methodology are
unknown, each user accesses its output, that is her own ranking at
any time. Let f be the ranking black-box function. More specifi-
cally, f takes as input the graph G∞ along with the attributes of
its nodes (that is {a(v),∀v ∈ V}) and assigns each node a score
f (i, a(i)), i ∈ G∞ from which is derived an observable ranking r of
all graph nodes such that : ∀i, j ∈ V(G∞)2, i >r j iff f (i, a(i)) >
f ( j, a( j)), that is : “node i is more important (or “influent”) than
node j”.
The objective of this paper is to gain knowledge on f , and more
specifically to evaluate the impact of each action in A on users ran-
kings. For a given user, the two main difficulties are that first, she
witnesses only a limited part of the input of f (typically her own
friends in the social graph). Second, the output of f is sparse, as
it only provides nodes with a total order relation (e.g., user x is
better ranked than her neighbor y). In order to try reversing f , we
assume the querying user is able to create a set of profiles Va in the
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Figure 1: A small query graph GQ, solving the single centrality
reverse engineering problem for plausible set Cbase.
social service, and have those profiles issue any single action of A.
She is also able to achieve any pair action between two profiles of
Va, therefore updating the subgraph of G∞ induced by nodes of Va.
Those two operations are conducted through API calls, as it is e.g.,
observed in practice in Facebook [2].
As a warm up, let us assume that f leverages exactly one of the
following classic centralitiesCbase = {degree, eccentricity, betweenness,
Pagerank, closeness} [6]. To determine which one is in use, one
user wants to build a small query graph GQ, attached to G∞ (then
G∞ ← G∞∪GQ), in order to reverse f . To start our analysis of f on
a clean basis, the user creates nodes ∈ GQ that are strictly identical
up to their connectivity (i.e., their attributes in a(v) regarding single
actions such as tweets or posted comments are empty).
LEMMA 1. The query graph GQ depicted on Figure 1, of 5
nodes, is sufficient to reverse engineer a function f that is based
on a single centrality ∈ Cbase, relatively to the other centralities in
the same set Cbase.
PROOF. The proof requires showing that such GQ is able to dis-
criminate the centralities considered in the setCbase. Consider graph
G∞∪GQ on Figure 1.GQ nodes are given the following ranking, for
centralities in Cbase 3 : < degree, [a1 =r a2 >r a3 =r a4 =r a5] >, <
eccentricity, [a1 >r a2 =r a3 >r a4 =r a5] >, < betweenness, [a1 >r
a2 >r a3 =r a4 =r a5] >, < Pagerank, [a2 >r a1 >r a4 =r a5 >r
a3] >, < closeness, [a1 >r a2 >r a3 >r a4 =r a5] >. All ran-
kings are indeed unique, thus allowing to designate the centrality
used, by user observing rankings produced by f at GQ nodes she
controls.
Note that GQ is not the unique graph solving this problem ins-
tance.
There are obvious interests in minimizing the size of the construc-
ted query graph : first, constructing a bigger graph requires a longer
time, especially if actions on the service platform are rate-limited
on operations. Second, the bigger the query, the easier it can be de-
tected by the social service. Note that the graph GQ \ a5, of size
4 is not a solution, as degree and betweenness produce the same
[a1 >r a2 >r a3 =r a4] ranking, as for both fringe nodes a3 and a4,
betweenness is 0, and degree is 1.
3. GENERALDISCRETECENTRALITYDIS-
CRIMINATION
We now generalize the reversing logic used on the previous example
to a set C of arbitrary centralities, possibly in use nowadays. Fur-
thermore, we extend the notion of centrality to the one presented
in [1] : a centrality is any node-level measure.
3. we conducted numerical simulations using the networkx library :
https://networkx.github.io/
We first draw two observations : discrimination is made by the
ranking, therefore to distinguish between d different centralities
one requires at least d different rankings. Thus |GQ|! ≥ d. Second,
the discrimination in this set of centralities is made thanks to graphs
we call delta-reversal graphs.
DEFINITION 1 (DELTA-REVERSAL GRAPHS). ∆XY is the set
of graphs such that ∀G ∈ ∆XY ,∃i, j ∈ V(G) s.t. fX(G, i) < fX(G, j)∧
fY (G, i) > fY (G, j).
A delta-reversal graph for two centralities X and Y is a graph where
the ranking r induced by using the ranking provided by fX (i.e., by
a function f only relying on centrality X) on the nodes of G would
be different than the ranking induced by fY . Any such graph would
thus allow to discriminate between X and Y being used as f 4. The
following property is a very handy property for using delta-reversal
graphs.
DEFINITION 2 (CENTRALITY k-LOCALITY). Let X a centra-
lity. X is said k-local if ∀G1,G2 graphs,∀i ∈ V(G1), j ∈ V(G2),Vk(i,G1) =
Vk( j,G2) ⇒ fX(i,G1) = fX( j,G2), where Vk(i,G) is the graph in-
duced by the k-hop neighborhood of i in G.
The intuition is the following : a k-local centrality only considers
the k-hop neighborhood of a node when assessing it’s importance.
This can be seen as the “scope” of a centrality : any topological
modification beyond this scope leaves the node importance unchan-
ged. This can be exploited to join Delta-reversal graphs into one
single query graph while maintaining their discriminating power.
Following this intuition, the following definition states an impor-
tant property of those graphs.
DEFINITION 3. LetG a ∆XY graph, and dist(i, j) the hop-distance
between nodes i and j. If ∃i, j, k ∈ G s.t. dist(i, k) > ` ∧ dist( j, k) >
`∧ fX(G, i) < fX(G, j)∧ fY (G, i) > fY (G, j) thenG is `-discriminating.
k is called an anchor.
3.1 Combining Delta-reversal graphs
We now explain how to combine pairwise discriminating graphs
into a single query graph.
LEMMA 2. Let X,Y,Z three centralities and let k their maxi-
mum locality. Then ∀G1 ∈ ∆X,Y ,G2 ∈ ∆X,Z ,G3 ∈ ∆Y,Z , if all these
graphs are ` > k-discriminating, then GS = (V(G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3) ∪
{a}, E(G1 ∪G2 ∪G3) ∪ {(a,m1), (a,m2), (a,m3)}) ∈ ∆XYZ .
PROOF. Since G1 is discriminating, m1 exists. Let i1, j1 the cor-
responding anchor nodes. Let σX(G1), σY (G1) the ranks of centra-
lities X,Y . Assume w.l.o.g. that σX(G1, i1) > σX(G1, j1) and yet
σY (G1, i1) < σY (G1, j1). Consider i1 : we have d(i1,m1) > k and
thus Vk(i1,G1) = Vk(i1,GS ). Thus fX(i,G1) = fX(i,GS ). As the
same applies for j1 we deduce that σX(GS , i1) > σX(GS , j1) and yet
σY (GS , i1) < σY (GS , j1).
Thus GS ∈ ∆XY . A similar reasoning holds for i2, j2 and i3, j3
thus GS ∈ ∆XZ ∩ ∆YZ ∩ ∆XZ = ∆XYZ .
This lemma is very useful, as it provides us with a way to create
discriminating graphs from pair of known ones. The following lemma
finally generalizes the construction :
4. Examples of discriminating graphs are known in the litera-
ture, as they serve as motivation for introducing new centralities :
see for instance [8], where a graph is presented that discriminates
random walk betweenness from classic betweenness centrality.
Data: G∞, a target node a ∈ V(G∞), the set C of suspected
centralities (|C| = d), D the set of pairwise
discriminating graphs for set C
Result: The centrality X in use in f
1 ∀GXY ∈ D, let iXY , jXY s.t.
fX(iXY ) > fX( jXY ) ∧ fY (iXY ) < fY ( jXY );
2 //Building and attaching the general query graph to G∞
3 for ∀G ∈ D do
4 V(G∞)← V(G∞) ∪ V(G);
5 E(G∞)← E(G∞) ∪ E(G) ∪ (a, anchor(G));
6 r ← r( f (G∞);
7 Let M be a d × d matrix initialized to false;
8 //Retrieving the centrality in use in f
9 for a = 1 . . . d do
10 for b = a + 1 . . . d do
11 Ma,b = iXaXb >r jXaXb ;
12 Let s be s.t. ∀k = 1 . . . d,Ms,k = true;
13 return Xs;
Algorithm 1: A reverse engineering algorithm, identifying the
centrality in use in arbitrary centrality set C.
LEMMA 3. LetC a set of d centralities and let k their maximum
locality. Let D = {GAB ∈ ∆AB,∀A, B , A ∈ C2}, a set containing a
pairwise discriminating graph for each pair of centrality inC. If all
these graphs are ` > k-differentiated, then let GS = (V(∪G∈DG) ∪
{a}, E(∪G∈DG)∪{(a,mAB,∀A, B , A ∈ C}), where mXY is an anchor
of GXY ∈ D. Then GS ∈ ∆C .
PROOF. (sketch) : identical to Lemma 2.
The GS construction therefore allows for any set of centralities,
given pairwise discriminating graphs, to construct one general dis-
criminating graph achieving the reverse engineering process. Note
that the complexity is quadratic : a graph to compare d centralities
requires Ω(d2) pairwise discriminating graphs.
We are now ready to propose a general method to infer which
centrality is in use in f . It is shown in Algorithm 1.
THEOREM 1. Let G∞ a graph, and r an unknown ranking func-
tion relying on centrality z. If z ∈ C then Algorithm 1 returns z.
PROOF. First, observe that in Algorithm 1, lines 1−5 implement
the construction of a combined Delta-reversal graph as defined in
Lemma 3. Line 6 collects the resulting ranking. Consider M at line
12. For z to be correctly identified, two conditions must hold : i) the
line Mz,. contains only entries at true, and ii) all other lines Mi,., i , z
contain at least one false entry.
Consider line Mz,.. By contradiction, assume that one entry, say
j is false. Then necessarily iz, j <r jz, j line 11. Since r is obtained
using z, we deduce fz(iz, j) < fz( jz, j). This contradicts the definition
of iz, j and jz, j that are chosen line 1 in the subgraph Gz j such that
fz(iz, j) > fz( jz, j). We conclude that Mz,. contains only true entries.
Now, assume there exists another line, say i, such that Mi,. contains
only true entries. Consider column z : we have Mi,z =true. As in
the previous step, we deduce fz(ii,z) > fz( ji,z) ; this again contra-
dicts the definition of ii,z and ji,z chosen line 1 in Giz such that
fz(ii,z) < fz( ji,z). Thus every other line has at least a negative en-
try.
Therefore, we conclude that Xs = z line 13 : Algorithm 1 has
identified z.
The sketch presented in Algorithm 1 can be optimized in many
ways. First, one can build the query graph incrementally and only
Data: G∞, a target node a ∈ V(G∞), operations {u1, . . . , ud}
Result: An estimate of h (i.e., the vector containing the weight
of each centrality in f )
1 Let k be a vector of size d − 1 initialized to 0;
2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
3 //attach a query node to target node a, and conduct
operations over it
4 Create node ai : V(G∞)← V(G∞) ∪ {ai};
5 Add edge (ai, a) : E(G∞)← E(G∞) ∪ {(ai, a)};
6 Apply ui(ai);
7 W.l.o.g., ud is the operation with the highest impact (that is at
this step ∀ j < d, a j <r ad) ; Reorder otherwise;
8 for i = 1 to d − 1 do
9 //identify operation thresholds
10 ki ← maxx≥1(uxi (ai) <r ud(ad));
11 //J is the matrix where each element (i, j) is the impact of ki
applications of ui on the jth centrality of node ai, minus the
impact of operation ud on ad;
12 Let Ji, j = c j(u
ki
i (ai)) − c j(ud(ad)) ;
13 Set Jd,. = 0d ;
14 return Ker(J) //find h s.t. J.h = 0, thus is solution to the
reverse engineering of f
Algorithm 2:A general reverse engineering algorithm, estimating
the linear weight combination of centralities in f .
test the relevant centralities : letGab be the first added Delta-reversal
graph line 4 and 5. It is possible to test directly the value of Mab.
Assume Ma,b=False, then necessarily centrality Xa is not used in f .
There is therefore no need to add any other Gac,∀c ∈ D graph.
Second, observe that we focus on pairwise Delta-reversal graphs.
Some Delta-reversal graphs allow to differentiate between more
than two centralities (for instance, the graph GQ Figure 1 that al-
lows to differentiate between 5 centralities at once, while contai-
ning only 5 nodes). Using such graphs drastically reduces the size
of final the query graph.
4. REVERSEENGINEERINGALINEARCOM-
BINATION OF CENTRALITIES
In the previous section, we have seen how to identify which cen-
trality is used given a finite set of suspected centralities. We now
propose a method for extending to a f that is a linear combination
of suspected centralities, for it allows more complex and subtle ran-
king functions.
As the space of possible centralities is theoretically infinite, we
assume the user takes a bet on a possibly large list of d centralities
in a set C, that are potentially involved in f . We will show that our
approach also allows to infer the absence of significant impact of a
given centrality in set C, and thus conclude that it is probably not
used in f .
In a nutshell, the query proceeds as follows. The user leverages
an arbitrary node a, already present in G∞. She then creates d iden-
tical nodes (i.e., profiles) and connects them to a. The ranking of
those d created nodes is thus the same, by construction. She ap-
plies to each node a different serie of API calls (i.e., topological
operations, attaching them one node for instance). After each serie,
ranking of those nodes changes. Based on those observed changes,
she is able to sort the impact of those calls, and thus to describe the
impact of one given call by a composition of smaller effect calls.
This allows her to retrieve the weights assigned by f to the d cen-
tralities in set C, by solving a linear equation system.
Lets consider the following image : imagine you have an old wei-
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Figure 2: Solution to reverse engineer f , uncovering h.
ghing scale (that only answers “left is heavier than right” or vice-
versa) and a set of fruits (say berries, oranges, apples and melons)
you want to weigh. Since no “absolute” weighing system is avai-
lable, the solution is to weighs the fruits relatively to each other,
for instance by expressing each fruit as a fraction of the heaviest
fruit, the melon. One straightforward approach is to directly test
how many of each fruit weigh one melon. This is the approach
adopted here. However, the problem here is that in general, we are
not able to individually weigh each fruit (centrality). Instead, we
have a set of d different fruit salads. This is not a problem if the
composition of each salad is known (i.e., the impact of API calls) ;
one has to solve a linear system : there are d different combinations
that are equal, thus providing d equations.
A reverse engineering algorithm.
Black-box function f relies on arbitrary centralities chosen from
a set we denote C of size |C| = d. Let ci ∈ Rd be the d dimensio-
nal column vector representing each of the d computed centrality
values for a node i in G∞.
We assume that f is linear in all directions (i.e., f is a weighted
mean of all centralities) : ∃h ∈ Rd s.t. f (i) = ci.h. Reverse en-
gineering the topological impact over the final ranking thus boils
down to find h (and therefore directly obtain f ).h is then the vector
of coefficients corresponding to centralities listed in C. The user
performs operations on G∞ through API calls, starting from an
existing node a. We assume she is able to find d different opera-
tions denoted {u1, . . . , ud}. Consider for instance one operation of
that set, noted u1(i), and that simply adds a neighbor to node i :
G∞(V, E), i →u1(i) (V ∪ {a}, E ∪ {(i, a)}). Such an operation has an
impact on i’s topological role in f , let u ∈ Rd be this impact on all
centralities in set C : ci ← ci + u.
Regarding those operations, we assume that : i) the user is able
to determine the result of each ui’s impact on her created node’s
centrality values (i.e., she computes uki (i),∀i ≤ d, and where k > 0
is the number of applications of the operation), and ii) they are
linearly independent : each operation has a unique impact on com-
puted centralities from set C.
The query proceeds as shown on Algorithm 2, where notations
are defined. First, observe that by construction rank(J) ≤ d − 1.
The last operation ud is the reference against which we compare
other operations. Line 12 records the maximum number of same ui
operation applications that lead to the same rank (or close) than a
single ud operation on another node.
Consider a line i of J (L.12 Algorithm 2, also represented on
Figure 2). Since at the end ai =r ad (or close), we have (cai +
ukii (ai))h = (cad +ud(ad))h±ui(ai).h. Since by construction cai = cad ,
therefore we seek h s.t. ukii (ai)h− ud(ad)h = 0. Or matrix notation :
J.h = 0 : h is in the kernel of J.
Intuitively, the fact that we get infinitely many solutions (α.h,∀α ∈
R+) comes from our observation method : we are never able to ob-
serve actual scores, but rather rankings. Since multiplying h by a
constant does not change the final ranking, any vector co-linear to,
e.g., h/||h|| is a solution.
One important remark is that one cannot formally claim that one
centrality metric is not in use in C with this algorithm. Assume for
instance that one centrality, e.g., number of tweets of the conside-
red node, is 103 times less important than another centrality, e.g.,
degree. Then we will not be able to witness its effect unless we
produce 103 tweets. And after 102 tweets, we will only be able to
conclude : number of tweets is at least 102 times less important
that degree. One can reasonably assume that such an imbalance in
practice means that one service operator will not compute a possi-
bly costly centrality to use it to such a low extent in f ; this thus
makes our algorithm able to discard barely or not used centralities
in C. Finally, we note that with cost(ui) the number of calls issued
by operation ui, the total number of operations for weighting two
centralities in C is at most cost(ud) +
∑d−1
i=1 ki.cost(ui).
Exploiting local centralities : an illustration.
We demonstrated how to reverse engineer a linear combination
of centralities. The difficulty for the user is to compute the impact
of u operations on the suspected centralities. In the easiest case, sus-
pected centralities behave linearly (such as e.g., degree, between-
ness), and it is therefore easy to compute the impact of an update.
The case of non-linearity can be solved using the locality of cen-
tralities : if c is k-local, the observation of the k-hop neighborhood
of a node is required to reverse engineer f . We illustrate this on a
simple example.
G∞
a
a1 a2
a11 a12 a13 a21 a22 a23
u1 u2
Figure 3: Querying G∞ : conducing two sequences of operations u1
and u2, attaching them to a.
Let us assume a ranking function f whose internals use a com-
bination of c1 : clustering centrality 5 and c2 : degree (i.e., C =
[c1, c2]). Without loss of generality, we assume that the coefficient
for degree in h is h1 = 1, so that we seek the corresponding co-
efficient h2 = h. Let us consider the following two operations in
{u1, u2}. Operation u2 simply attach a node to one initial query node
(a1 or a2). u1 starts by attaching queryS ize−1 nodes to query node
a1. At each call, an edge between two randomly selected attached
nodes is added, to increase clustering. u1 and u2 are represented
on Figure 3, for a queryS ize = 4. User can compute the value of
uk−11 (a1) and u
k−1
2 (a2) at any time, since she controls those nodes.
We simulated the query with aG∞ being a 1, 000 nodes Barabási-
Albert graph with an average degree of 5, estimating h using u1 and
u2 operations with Algorithm 1. Figure 4 presents the obtained re-
sults : a point (x, y) means the real value of h is x and was estimated
by Algorithm 1 as y. Black dots plot the real coefficient values of
h. Each colored area represents the estimated (reverse engineered)
coefficients, while each color represents a query size, i.e., the num-
5. this centrality has no linear behavior, but is 1−local.
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
2
4
6
1 2 3 4 5
Real Coeff.
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ff.
querySize
l
l
l
l
l
20
30
40
50
60
Figure 4: Reversing a f with unknown coefficients from 1 to 5, with
various query sizes (node creations.)
ber of nodes created by the user to reverse f . The larger the query,
the more precise the reverse engineered results. We note that if the
real values of coefficients to be estimated are bigger (e.g., 4 or 5 on
the x-axis), estimations show lower precision (larger areas). Des-
pite this remark, estimations appear unbiased.
5. DISCUSSION
The will for web-services transparency starts to trigger new re-
search works. Security-oriented paper [9] has shown that it is pos-
sible to “steal” some machine learning models from online ser-
vices, using a reasonable number of queries to APIs. XRay [7] for
instance proposes a correlation algorithm, that aims at inferring to
which data input is associated a personalized output to the user.
This Bayesian-based algorithm returns data that are the cause of
received ads, while we seek in this paper to retrieve the internals of
a black-box ranking function, in order to assess what is the effect of
user actions on the output peer ranking. We have presented a gene-
ral framework. Based on the centralities that might be used by the
ranking function, there remain work for a user, for building discri-
minating graphs, and for finding small topological operations that
will make the reverse engineering possible. For a ranking service
operator, the countermeasure is the opposite : she must find ran-
king metrics that are computationally hard to distinguish, typically
ones that would ensure the detection of the querying user by the
internal security system. We find this to be an interesting challenge
for futureworks
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